Introduction
Along the lines of the insider-outsider discussion on matters of Corporate Governance, Spain remains somewhere in between. Market mechanisms do play an increasing role but, at the same time, important institutions such as the state, large banks and, more recently, managers of large and, often, recently privatised companies have become controlling shareholders, exerting important roles at the time of solving relevant issues on Corporate Governance.
By the end of 1995, our year of reference, Spanish companies were still immersed in a process of transition towards a more international, competitive and open system. The state still held important stakes in several of the largest Spanish companies, although the privatisation momentum was increasing. We could summarise the Spanish corporate ownership and equity market in the following 5 points:
1.) The number of Spanish listed companies remains still rather small, 606, and counts for only 0.5 % of the total number of Spanish public companies. Nevertheless, in 1995 the stock market turnover was equivalent to 10% of the Spanish GDP. Although still low respect to U.K. or U.S.A., this figure compares favourably to the situation in other European countries. Moreover, the depth and importance of the stock market, relative to other financial alternatives, keeps growing year after year and several large Spanish companies have started to be present in the NYSE and other foreign markets 1 .
2.) Overall, there is a high degree of ownership concentration but this is lower than most European countries. According to our data, the direct shareholding of the largest stake becomes, on average, 30.27%, and goes up to 32.13%, once we consider a sample of non-financial companies. Alternatively, if we repeat our calculations in terms of voting blocks, (i.e., the sum of direct and indirect voting rights in our analysis) both figures become larger, reaching a substantial 38.28 % and 40.09 % respectively.
Furthermore, if we think in terms of potential coalitions and we add up the corresponding figures for other large shareholders, the new averages go beyond the majority line fairly quickly. For example, adding up the shares of the three largest shareholders, C3, we get an accumulated amount of 47.06 % for direct shares and a 56.59% voting block for our sample of 193 non-financial companies. In fact, a C2 measure is enough to achieve majority in the voting block case, while a C4 must be formed, on average, to reach the majority with direct stakes. Alternatively, one could appreciate the degree of ownership concentration through the average number of shareholders that report direct stakes equal or greater than 5%. This figure lies around 3.5 (3.41 for the sample of non-financial companies and 3.66 for our larger sample).
--4 3.) When we take a look at the type of shareholders, we find that industrial (nonfinancial) firms 2 are the main investor category, followed by families and financial firms other than banks. We are able to distinguish six types of shareholders in our analysis: families (or individuals), banks, financial firms other than banks, the state, foreign firms and non-financial firms (or industrial firms). From our results, it seems as if Spanish banks, unlike German banks, were no longer playing at present an important ownership role. Nevertheless, when the banks participate in a firm, they do it with important stakes for the case of small firms and medium-large firms. Foreign firm's participation is also directed to gain control in the firms. On the other hand, family or individual ownership is not so prevalent in Spain as in other countries.
Although individual participation averages 10.93% overall, this figure becomes less than 3% in the largest decile, where the most important companies are.
4.) Although we lack the precise information to address properly the issue of groups with our data on direct and indirect stakes, we believe that group voting or voting blocks, as a whole, do not play an important role for the listed Spanish companies.
Indirect ownership becomes a device used by companies and individuals to exert voting power beyond the direct ownership. The indirect ownership contribution via holdings of intermediate companies to these voting blocks is 23%. Nevertheless, the distortion of the voting rights versus cash flow rights relationship is weak, about 4%.
When computing indirect ownership, the figures of ownership concentration for the largest shareholder are, on average, an 8% higher than the direct ownership figure.
5.) Until recently, state ownership has been quite relevant in a number of large Spanish firms. Those companies were mainly involved in the historical and natural monopolies (oil, tobacco, energy and telecommunication services). After a strong privatisation process, such participation has almost disappeared and the state has been replaced by a large number of Spanish retail investors, some large Spanish institutional investors (banks, most of the time) and some international institutional investors. The state, nevertheless, has kept for itself a golden share-type mechanism to be used only under certain (and quite narrow) scenarios. The first time such mechanism was enacted was in 1995 with Repsol, the largest oil Spanish company, and some other cases have followed: Telefónica, the former telecommunication monopoly and Endesa, the largest Spanish electricity utility. Although this golden-share mechanism has been included in the privatisation processes as a protection of the public and national interest, the state has never used it.
Finally, previous to 1996 and more intensively during the last two years, several companies have joined the ranks of listed companies, either through privatisation or Among Spanish large firms, the majority of them are SA. These companies are subject to the Spanish Act, "Ley de Sociedades Anónimas" that also establishes a number of requirements in terms of information disclosure and corporate governance. More detailed information containing a summary of the legal requirements is presented in 
2.2
Ownership disclosure legislation.
SECURITIES MARKET LEGISLATION
The Spanish Securities Markets Act was enacted in 1988 (Ley 24/1988 de 28 de Julio) with the purpose of reforming the organisation and supervision of the securities markets. This piece of legislation and the regulation that followed achieved several goals. We want to emphasise the following: they (i) established an independent regulatory authority, the CNMV (Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores) to supervise the securities markets, (ii) established a framework for the regulation of trading practices, tender offers and insider trading, (iii) required companies listed on a Spanish stock exchange to file annual audited financial statements and to make public quarterly financial information, (iv) established the legal framework for the Electronic Quotation System and (v) provided for transfer of shares by book entry or by delivery of evidence of title.
In particular, this Act establishes, in its chapter 53, the obligation to communicate to the supervising authorities and to the issuer of the titles the acquisition or transmission of relevant holdings.
The Council Directive 88/627/CEE of December 12 on reporting requirements for relevant holdings followed to the previously mentioned Act. There are also anti-takeover devices such as voting caps, supermajority requirements for some company decisions, or statutory rules that make more difficult the access to the Board of Directors. We will mention some of them for the case of Telefónica, although these instruments remain second in our interest with respect to our main concern: ownership structure of the Spanish firms.
The Spanish transposition of the transparency directive refers to the notification of large shareholdings in terms of ownership rights. These references are about current ownership or voting rights, but they never refer to future rights as it could be the case 
BUSINESS GROUPS
The business groups phenomena was also important in Spain until the mid eighties, mainly with banks acting as controlling shareholders. After that period, there has been a decade without the presence of these large non-state owned groups, with few exceptions like the Kuwait Investment Office (K.I.O.), that used an industrial company as head of the group in Spain. Currently, and due to the privatisation process among other circumstances, some groups of stable shareholders have emerged within the large listed companies. Moreover, they are able, quite often, to exert some influence on managers, their decisions and even their appointments.
One piece of information we can provide, refers to the existence of banking groups. In Spain, as it used to be the case in other continental European countries, the financial system was, and still is, up to a certain level, mainly bank-oriented. Although there exists an important process to incorporate and move closer to a market oriented system (increasing importance of stock market) the role of some banks still remains quite important.
Even for those cases of banking groups, it remains difficult to establish which companies belong to a group. The accounting rules will determine which companies have to submit consolidate reports as a group. According to Spanish Company Law, a firm belongs to a group if one of the following conditions takes place: (i) there is a majority of voting rights (direct plus indirect shares); (ii) there is the right to appoint or remove the majority of the Board Members or (iii) there exists a majority of votes through internal contractual arrangements among companies.
The use of the legal definition of "group" for practical purposes is complex, and far from satisfactory for most companies. First, the legal criteria "having majority of voting rights" is hard to accommodate with the condition "having the right to appoint or remove the majority of the management Board Members". Second, for a sample of companies, and given our set of voting and ownership data, the definition of "group" has to establish the percentage of shareholdings considered as "controlling ownership". Such percentage could be fixed at the majority level and if so, we could say that a company belongs to a group when the head of the group, or some other companies in the group, hold more than 50% of shares. But in order to gain the right to appoint or remove Board Members, it is often unnecessary to own more than 50% of shares. Alternative thresholds, such as 25% of the shares or even lower figures, could be sufficient criteria. Third, there is also the legal way of defining a group through the "existence of a majority of votes through internal contractual arrangements among shareholders". To the extent that these kind of agreements are not publicly reported, such a criterion cannot be used in our analysis.
Therefore, from the available data set, containing information on large shareholdings, it becomes quite hard to define, in practical terms, which firms belong to a business group due mainly to the disparity of criteria that can be invoked and, more importantly, to their difficult interpretation.
Voting rights dilution and restrictions. The rights of the minority shareholders.
Direct ownership: we measure direct ownership of one shareholder through the direct voting power of his share stake. We conduct such calculations for the largest shareholder, the second largest, the third one and so on. In order to check deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule, we will later compare this notion with the voting block measure. We also consider other examples of distortions from the one-share-onevote rule, like the issue of non-voting shares, the presence of voting caps and the recent addition of a golden-share mechanism for newly privatised companies.
Under the current Spanish company law (RDL 1564 (RDL /1989 , the companies can issue non-voting shares up to 50% of the outstanding equity. In order to compensate the lack of vote, the law states that non-voting shares will yield a minimum dividend of 5%, and once this amount has been decided, non voting shares will have the same dividend right as ordinary shares. Until now, and with the only exception of Banco Guipuzcoano, Given the existent dilution for this company, these measures create an added power for the managerial team. We believe this case is especially relevant because we are dealing precisely with the largest company within the Spanish economy and others could follow this trend. Through these measures, we are breaking the one-share-onevote rule, giving more discretionary power to managers and seriously affecting the governance of the firm.
Data collection
The available ownership and voting data come from the Comisión Nacional del Table 3 )
From table 2 we already observed that the number of listed firms was decreasing overtime when we look at the total number of companies, the active companies or the number of listed firms in the outcry market. Nevertheless, the relative importance of the Stock Markets and the number of firms in the electronic market, the most active, are both increasing. After 1995, this trend has followed.
The information contents of the CNMV data come from the forms that companies and significant shareholders present to the Commission. With the information of large ownership positions above 5%, there is also available information about those important facts able to influence share prices, accounting information of listed companies and board members data with their respective shareholdings in an individual basis.
The original data set, with 721 firms, has been arranged in order to obtain a sample comparable to other EU countries. The initial number of companies with available information on ownership is biased toward the financial sector (more than 40% of cases, 307 companies). This initial data set reduces to 394 firms, once we cross ownership data with market values from stock exchanges. The reasons to remove companies from this set of data are (i) the low trading frequency for some companies that makes difficult to calculate capitalisation values (ii) the cases where the sum of all known ownership stakes was higher than 100% due to errors on the sharehoders' notifications (iii) companies where full identification was impossible to obtain and (iv), differences in data codification between stock exchanges and the CNMV.
Given our interest on the industrial issues and the self impose requirement of harmonisation with other countries data, most of the following analysis has been conducted for a subsample of 193 non-financial companies, even though we believe similar results can be extracted from the larger sample. Table 3 presents detailed information about samples compositions and sectors of activity distribution.
( Table 3 near here)
The aggregated market value of the 394 companies included in our large sample is 19.3
Ptas billion. This figure represents 88% of the electronic market capitalisation in 1995, and the 81.7% of the total (the four Spanish stock markets) capitalisation. The concentration of the market capitalisation in a reduced number of companies is a characteristic of the Spanish stock markets, concentration that is even larger when looking at trading volumes.
We have calculated voting power and ownership structures using the last notification for every large shareholder and board member before December 31, 1995. The reported shareholdings have been divided in several categories. The first distinction is between Spanish and foreign investors. Moreover, among the Spanish shareholders is possible to distinguish between individuals (or families) and companies. From the companies' code, the identification between state ownership, non-financial and financial companies follow. This last category is also divided in banks and financial companies other than banks (investment trusts, investment companies, real state financing and insurance companies in our case).
Direct ownership
The Spanish transposition of the EU transparency Directive does not allow to determine differences between the information on significant shareholdings and information on voting rights for listed companies. There is no publicly available information concerning voting agreements or voting coalitions. However, in between the direct share stakes and the ultimate voting blocks, there are frequently indirect shareholdings, which allow some firms or individuals to control listed firms via intermediate companies without the corresponding cash flow rights. As a consequence, we will distinguish among direct stakes and voting blocks We cannot track for the Spanish case the ultimate voting blocks in some companies. Thus, the distinction between direct stakes and group blocks will be identical to the previous one.
First, we present the data concerning direct stakes of the largest shareholders, by sectors of activity according to the CNMV classification.
( Table 4 near here)
Notice that the sum of the different investors' largest share does not coincide with the total figure. This is so by construction: while the second column captures the average proportion of shares owned by the largest investor of any kind, the following columns refer to the average largest share stake for each category (independently of being the largest investor in that firm or not).
It is interesting to emphasise that the largest investor holds on average quite a large share. The differences between the average of the largest stake of non-financial companies sample and financial companies are not huge, 32.13 and 28.49 respectively. We also observe, as Galve and Salas ( These results follow a similar pattern to the one observed for the larger sample and there are no significant differences on average direct stakes when we only consider nonfinancial companies (193 firms) and add up the stakes of other top shareholders.
(Insert figure 1 near here)
The 0.86% value in the largest stake bar fits in our 5% minimum threshold to compute ownership structure. This case, and few others with direct stakes below 5%, corresponds to reports that adding up direct plus indirect stakes achieve the mentioned 5%. The reason why it is not possible to detect the remaining value until 5% is that it is not mandatory to report it as direct stake, and only board of directors members have to report below the 5%
limit. This situation does not happen when computing voting blocks, formed by direct plus indirect stakes. (see Figure 2) . The zero values in the minimum bars of the rest of shareholdings mean simply that, at least for one of the cases, there are no large second shareholder that has a 5% stake.
Once the high level of ownership concentration for the Spanish listed companies has been detected, it is also interesting to look at the contribution of other top shareholders and observe how quickly the majorities can be formed. Thus, the combination of the three top shareholders goes to 47.06% which seems a high figure 
Direct Ownership by Size Classes
Next, we present our analysis on the 193 industrial companies, combining direct ownership and companies' size in TABLE 5.
( Table 5 near here)
This table shows that ownership concentration does not decrease with size. Around the median and the third quartile there is a significant number of companies with average largest shareholder greater than smaller companies. In fact, for those cases, a coalition formed by the top three to five direct stakes have, on average, 50% of the shares.
As it can be appreciated in the C1 column, the average direct share is 32.13%, for the Spanish companies and this figure becomes even larger for the segment of firms which are relatively large although not the largest, reaching a 44.74% in the 75-90% size interval. The figure then hints that the largest shareholder seems to enjoy a fair amount of control over the firm.
Voting Blocks
For the Spanish data the term "voting block" becomes identical to the concept "group block" used in other country reports. The shareholder's attributed votes are from indirect ownership, through some intermediate companies which enjoy voting rights on the listed companies.
We calculate voting blocks considering direct and indirect holdings. In order to avoid double counting, we introduce a correction for amounts of indirect holdings greater than 5% (the Spanish threshold to communicate) through intermediate companies. In such context, the direct shareholding of the intermediate company is removed as a direct holding and added to the voting block of the mother company. This method allows us to value accurately blocks of vote or ownership when we add up percentages of shares for several large shareholders for a given company.
The average value of the largest voting block for the full sample, that is, including the financial companies, is over 38%, and it reaches 40% for the non-financial companies.
Overall, non-financial companies become the most important investor category. State ownership is also quite important, but only in sectors linked to the previous existence of monopolies such as utilities, transport and communication. Comparing these results with direct stakes, foreign and individual investors or families become more powerful as voting block, using Spanish companies as intermediary instrument to control corporations.
( Table 6 near here)
As we did for the direct stakes case, we present now a more detailed analysis of the ownership structure of the 193 firms, where we make use of the notion of voting block. The largest voting block presents an average value of 40% and including the three largest the average block is over 56%. Like the previous figure on direct shareholdings, the contribution of voting power of the fourth and subsequent shareholders is weak, and only significant for a reduced number of companies (median close to zero) 6 .
Voting Blocks By Size Class
It is also useful to present these ownership data for the different sizes. Table 7 shows that in the medium size range (25%-75%) we have more than 50% of companies with a special characteristic: they present the larger values in terms of ownership and voting power concentration. This goes, some how, against the general intuition in the sense that one would expect a decreasing relationship between voting blocks and company size. Crespi From Figure 4 , we also appreciate some steps around the 25% and the 50% level, which can be interpreted. Spanish Takeover legislation determines that for acquisition of 50% of company equity, the takeover bid has to be addressed to the 75% of the outstanding equity.
This could explain, to some extent, the peaks we found below the 75% threshold.
For the voting blocks measure, we observe that small shares are now much less prevalent and still remain some steps around the mentioned levels of 25% an 50%, which seem to be sensitive to control. The use of intermediate companies for control purposes (voting blocks) displaces to higher values the sample distribution, when compared with direct ownership stakes.
(Insert figure 3 near here)
The intuition that the compared histogram give us is confirmed by the percentile plot of It is interesting to observe that at the 25% threshold there are more companies in both measures; direct holdings and voting blocks. The takeover legislation help us to understand those weak flat segments in the curves.
Separation Measures
In the case of Spain, where there is no deviation from one-share one-vote rule 7 it is interesting to know, according to the public available information, the importance of voting blocks to separate ownership from voting rights.
In this section we are interested to see how powerful are the indirect shareholdings as a separation device between real voting power and cash flow rights. Independently from the mentioned antitakeover devices as voting caps, supermajority requirements, or rules difficulting the access to the board of directors, the use of the parent -subsidiary figure, or intermediate companies as a bridge to control companies, is the main design available to spanish listed companies.
To the extent that there is no public information about voting agreements or similar instruments, indirect shareholdings is the way to compute the power of this procedure. Is it really important, in aggregated terms, the separation of cash flow rights from voting rights? To answer this question, we focus on the shareholder's communications instead of companies voting or ownership structure. Looking at the available communications of large shareholders for our 193 industrial companies sample we know the pattern they follow when using indirect ownership through third companies instead of direct holdings. ( Table 8 near here)
Conclusions
By the end of 1995, Spanish firms presented a situation of highly concentrated ownership.
Nevertheless, if we compare this data with other European countries, the Spanish levels are the lowest with the exception of the U.K. Non-financial firms were the most important investors among the different categories. Bank participation, unlike it used to be the case in the past, was not so important and remained focused in certain sectors and companies.
Banks as large shareholders are important mainly in the banking sector, and they also have average values of 16% as larger shareholders in the communication industry, with a voting power similar to the government's one.
Once we calculate direct stakes we saw that ownership concentration turns out to be rather large in the Spanish case, without the presence of holdings or other indirect ownership mechanisms. This view is reinforced by the fact that the second largest direct stake is also quite large on average. Then, an important question arises: why would Spanish firms need pyramidal schemes? Probably not for ownership or control reasons as these data show.
Leverage could provide an alternative explanation.
This ownership view from 1995 has recently changed due to the privatisation process.
State participation that until 1995 was quite relevant in specific sectors and in many of the largest companies, has practically disappeared by mid 1998.
To check the consequences of privatisation on ownership and other features of corporate governance, such as the incentives of managers, their monitoring and the relation with the shareholders of these new firms are important questions that should be addressed.
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